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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind 
Sebastian Schmidt 
 
1. The Problem of Mental Normativity 
Our attitudes – our beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions – are not actions. They are 
conceived of as mental states we are in, rather than as things we actively perform. Intuitively, 
we are not responsible merely for being in a state – at most, we are responsible for causing a 
state or for failing to avoid it. And yet we respond to and evaluate our attitudes in ways which 
are similar to the ways in which we respond to and evaluate our actions. We think that we 
ought to believe in human-induced climate change, and we even consider it to be appropriate 
to criticize others if they fail to believe in it. A malicious desire, like the desire for another’s 
suffering, can rightly provoke not only disapproval, but also resentment or indignation. An 
emotion like anger might turn out to be unjustified, and we might owe an apology to the 
person who was the target of our hostile emotion. And merely intending to become a better 
person is often already worthy of praise or credit.1  
Indeed, it is a widely shared assumption also in contemporary epistemology and 
metaethics that not only our actions, but also our attitudes are governed by norms, and that we 
are, in some sense, responsible for whether we comply with these norms. In epistemology, 
there is a long tradition that aims at providing a justification for our beliefs about an external 
world. Skeptical challenges – as posed by the thought experiments of the Cartesian Demon 
(Descartes 1641) or the Brain in a Vat (Putnam 1981) – call into doubt that we have reasons 
for our everyday beliefs (like your belief that you are reading this text right now). Replying to 
such skeptical challenges – justifying our everyday beliefs – is sometimes viewed as the 
central motivation for engaging in epistemology.2 It is thus not farfetched at all to conceive of 
epistemology as a normative discipline analogous, somehow, to ethics. How far we can take 
this analogy is, of course, a question open to reasonable dispute. Especially Clifford (1877) 
and James (1896) took the analogy so far as to speak of an ethics of belief: they discussed how 
moral and prudential considerations bear on the norms of belief, thereby motivating 
contemporary discussions about what kinds of reasons determine what we ought to believe.3 
In metaethics (broadly construed), an extensive and specialized discussion about the 
norms of rationality arose within the last decades. John Broome (2013) argued that being 
rational consists in having coherent attitudes, rather than in responding correctly to (apparent) 
reasons.4 According to Broome, we are, for example, rationally required to (roughly) intend 
those means that we believe are necessary to achieve our ends.5 This is a requirement to 
adjust our intentions and beliefs to each other. It is not presented as a requirement to perform 
certain actions in order to intentionally ensure by indirect means that we are coherent (for 
example, by meditation). Rather, rational requirements are meant to govern our attitudes 
directly. This also holds for accounts that conceive of rationality as the capacity to respond 
correctly to one’s reasons. For insofar as these accounts are concerned with responding to 
reasons for attitudes, they do not take themselves to be concerned with prudential or moral 
reasons for managing our attitudes.6 
It seems that we do not (or cannot) weigh rational requirements governing our 
attitudes against, say, prudential considerations that seem to favor an attitude. Take, for 
example, the consideration that an eccentric billionaire promises you a lot of money as a 
reward for causing yourself to believe something that is unsupported by your evidence. A 
common view holds that in such cases, there are two normative requirements in place: a 
rational requirement not to have the unsupported belief; and a practical requirement to cause 
yourself to have it.7 Such cases are currently debated, and some of our contributions will 
question the picture according to which epistemic reasons, or other object-given reasons for 
attitudes, constitute their own normative domain that is independent from the practical realms 
of prudence and morality.8 Yet the general framework in which philosophers currently 
conceive of rational requirements is to treat them as separate from, and quite unrelated to, 
practical requirements: prudence and morality govern our voluntary conduct, rationality 
governs our attitudes. Morality and prudence concern action; rationality concerns the mind.9 
However, philosophers have also recently discussed a line of thought that calls into 
doubt that our attitudes are the proper object of any normative evaluation whatsoever.10 
Roughly, the line of thought goes as follows. Our beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions are 
not subject to the will in the way our actions are. We cannot decide to believe in the way we 
can decide to act.11 When someone offers me a huge reward for believing, in the absence of 
adequate evidence, that there is an even number of stars in the universe, I will not be able to 
believe it. This is true even if I want to believe it because I want to have the reward. Similarly, 
it does not seem possible to desire, feel, or intend something merely because someone offers 
me a reward for doing so. It seems that we cannot believe that p for just any reason that shows 
it worth believing that p. It seems that we cannot adopt a mental state or an attitude for just 
any reason that shows it worth being adopted.12 
By contrast, if someone offered me a reward for performing an action for which I have 
no reward-independent reason, like the action of raising my arm right now, I could just do it 
and collect the reward. We usually can perform an action for any reason that shows the action 
worth doing: our actions are, as I would like to put it, exercises of voluntary control. We 
exercise voluntary control when we act: being able to act for reasons is a fundamental kind of 
freedom. Arguably, the fact that actions are free in this way is what explains why it can be 
true that we sometimes ought to do one thing rather than another: if raising my arm was not 
an exercise of voluntary control, it would not make sense to say that I ought to raise it. The 
rising of my arm would be a mere natural event outside the space of reasons that could not be 
evaluated in normative terms. In the absence of voluntary control, there would be no 
obligations to act, and no reasons to act in a certain way rather than in another. Maybe there 
would not even be such a thing as an action.13 Furthermore, it seems that we could not 
appropriately be blamed and praised for what we do if what we do was not an exercise of 
voluntary control. At least in this sense, Ought implies Can. 
This raises a philosophical puzzle. If being subject to norms and reasons requires 
voluntary control, then it becomes mysterious how anything can be subject to norms that is 
not under our voluntary control. How can epistemology then be concerned with the 
justification of our beliefs? And how can metaethics be concerned with normative 
requirements governing our beliefs and intentions? While contemporary philosophy assumes 
that there is mental normativity, we at the same time seem to lack an explanation of how there 
can be such a thing. So, how can it be that we ought to believe, desire, feel, or intend 
something, that we have reasons for mental states, and that we can be praised and blamed for 
them? Call this the problem of mental normativity.14, 15 
 
2. Locating Our Approach: How the Ethics of Belief Motivates an Ethics of Mind 
I take the following two questions as providing a helpful framework for joining the debates 
that I just sketched: 
1. How can we be responsible for our attitudes? 
2. What attitudes should we have? 
These are the fundamental questions of an ethics of mind.16 The first question is concerned 
with explaining how there can be such a thing as an ethics of mind – how our practice of 
holding each other accountable for our beliefs, emotions, desires, and intentions can be 
justified given that these attitudes are not under our voluntary control. Proponents in this 
debate either argue that attitudes are, contrary to first impression, controlled in a similar way 
as actions are controlled (“voluntarily”);17 or they argue that we can exercise a form of direct, 
but non-voluntary control over our attitudes, i.e. a form of direct control that is different from 
the control that we exercise when we act;18 or they deny that they are directly controlled in 
any way, and thus either deny some sense of “Ought implies Can,”19 or say that we are never 
directly responsible for our attitudes, but only indirectly insofar as we control our attitudes 
through our actions.20 By providing an explanation of our mental responsibility in this way, 
such accounts aim at providing a foundation for understanding the norms that underly our 
practice of holding one another accountable for our attitudes.21 
The second question is central to the debates about reasons for belief and about 
attitudinal rationality. It is concerned with the precise nature of the norms that govern our 
attitudes. If we can make sense of mental normativity and responsibility, then what are the 
standards or requirements that govern our attitudes, and what are the kinds of reasons for 
which we can hold attitudes, and how do we distinguish them? Are all reasons for attitudes 
object-given (or “of the right kind”), or are there state-given reasons (that is, “of the wrong 
kind”) as well?22 How do these reasons determine what we ought to believe, desire, feel, 
intend, etc.?23 And what is the normative force of these “mental Oughts,” which include the 
standards of epistemic rationality?24 
This overall framework for discussing mental normativity, provided by our two main 
questions, is mainly inspired by contemporary debates in the ethics of belief. The 
philosophical debate about whether we can be responsible for what we believe and what we 
ought to believe is flourishing like never before. Questions which preoccupied Clifford and 
James are discussed by contemporary scholars under the headings “Ethics of Belief” 
(Feldman 2000; Matheson/Vitz 2014), “Reasons for Belief” (Reisner/Steglich-Petersen 2011), 
“The Aim of Belief” (Chan 2013), and “Epistemic Norms” (Littlejohn/Turri 2013). Central 
questions include:  
- Is only evidence for or against p relevant for whether one ought to believe that p, or 
are there state-given reasons which favour having a belief, e.g., facts about how 
valuable it would be to believe that p?25 
- If only evidence is relevant to this question – can this fact be explained by conceptual 
features of belief, like belief’s “aim of truth”?26 
- Can we weigh epistemic and practical reasons against each other so as to determine 
what we ought to believe, all things considered?27  
- Is it even possible to believe for practical reasons?28 
- Do we have any meaningful control over what we believe? Given that we do not 
control our beliefs as we control our actions (“voluntarily”), how can we explain our 
responsibility for believing, especially given that we are often subject to the criticism 
of epistemic irrationality?29  
- How do we have to interpret epistemic norms, and especially their (apparent) 
normative force?30 
Discussions surrounding the ethics of belief are partly an upshot of what is often mentioned as 
the practical turn in contemporary epistemology. Early indicators for this movement were 
virtue epistemology and debates about pragmatic encroachment with respect to the analysis of 
knowledge.31 Currently, the practical turn is shaped not only by the ethics of belief, but also, 
for example, by discussions about the value of knowledge and true belief,32 as well as by 
debates in social epistemology,33 including feminist epistemology.34 
The present volume is in line with this practical turn in that its first part addresses the 
ethics of belief. There we discuss topics that currently shape and even broaden the scope of 
the practical turn, like control over belief and its implication for the ethics of belief (Lindner), 
the role of the epistemic community for the possibility of epistemic normativity (Chrisman), 
responsibility for believing and doxastic strength (Gaultier), the doxastic norms within 
relationships, and whether they require us to be doxastically partial towards, say, our friends 
(Crawford), the structure, content, and force of epistemic norms (Skipper/Steglich-Petersen), 
as well as practical reasons for suspending judgment (Lord). 
We summarize the contributions of Lindner, Chrisman, and Gaultier under the title 
“Doxastic Responsibility and Agency,” and the contributions of Crawford, Steglich-
Petersen/Skipper, and Lord under “Reasons for Belief.” While the first debate is more 
concerned with the possibility of an ethics of belief (compare question 1 of the ethics of 
mind), the latter debate is concerned with the nature and structure of an ethics of belief 
(compare question 2). The aim of this first part is to bring both debates closer to each other, 
especially because the two broad topics they discuss are connected in important ways: how 
we explain the possibility of epistemic normativity will shape our understanding of epistemic 
norms. For example, if we argue that belief is subject to a robust form of direct control, then a 
pragmatist account about what we ought to believe might seem more plausible.35 By contrast, 
if we are doxastic involuntarists, i.e., if we think that belief is not directly controlled at all, but 
nevertheless subject to a robust form of normativity, then an evidentialist picture might seem 
more attractive.36 
Our volume, however, also reaches beyond epistemology, and even beyond the ethics 
of belief. Our second part is introduced by two contributions that frame the ethics of mind 
more generally. The first subpart discusses the first main question of an ethics of mind: how 
can we be responsible for our attitudes? (Schmidt) The second one is concerned with an 
aspect of the second main question: how should we understand theoretical and practical 
rationality? (Ernst) We summarize these two contributions under the label “Responsibility, 
Reasons, and Rationality.” Especially in the second subpart, our focus will shift from the 
practical dimensions of belief to issues revolving around reasons, responsibility, and agency 
with respect to other mental states or attitudes – especially the ethics of blame (Coates), the 
ethics of fear in public contexts (Döring), the agency we exercise in deciding (Soteriou), our 
responsibility for our passing thoughts (Tognazzini), and the limits our mental responsibility 
when it comes to our phantasies and mind-wanderings (McCormick). We summarize these 
contributions under the title “The Ethics of Blame, Fear, Decision, Passing Thought, and 
Phantasy.” Both our subparts illustrate how we might approach an ethics of mind in 
contemporary philosophy: either “top-down” by deriving insights relevant for mental 
normativity from already existing debates (first subpart), or “bottom-up” by considering the 
normative dimensions of specific mental phenomena, and thus providing the building blocks 
for an ethics of mind (second subpart). 
In this second main part, some of our contributions are not (or not primarily) 
contributions to epistemology, even if epistemology is understood broadly as the study of the 
normativity of belief. Rather, they are more generally contributions to an ethics of mind, or to 
the discussion about the rationality of attitudes, or about what mental states or attitude we 
ought to have. Here our outlook is motivated both by general debates about the nature and 
normativity of rationality, where the focus is commonly not only on belief, but also on 
intention,37 by debates about the rationality of emotion,38 as well as by recent research on, 
more generally, responsibility for attitudes.39 Epistemologists can profit from research in 
these areas because there are parallels between the normativity of belief and the normativity 
of other attitudes –most strikingly the distinction between two kinds of (purported) reasons 
for attitudes: object-given and state-given, or “right kind” and “wrong kind” of reasons (on 
references, see note 22). Turning their attention beyond belief and towards attitudes in general 
will provide epistemologists with fresh arguments and ideas they would otherwise remain 
oblivious to. 
We discuss the most current ideas revolving around the normativity of mental states, 
and especially the normativity of belief in the first part. By focusing primarily on belief 
normativity, we hope to draw some insightful lessons from a flourishing debate which can 
then be used for working on the normativity of mental states more generally. Going beyond 
the practical turn in epistemology, our volume reaches towards an ethics of mind. 
 
3. The Contributions 
Our opening contribution in chapter 2 by Martina Lindner connects the classicus locus of the 
ethics of belief – W. K. Clifford’s paper – with the contemporary discussion about doxastic 
control. Clifford argues for the evidentialist principle that one should never believe upon 
insufficient evidence. His position differs from most contemporary evidentialist approaches in 
that he takes this principle to be a moral norm backed by a consequentialist justification. It is 
a widely held view that Clifford fails to establish his ethics of belief – not least because, as 
critics argue, a consequentialist moral framework commits one to an ethics of belief that is 
(more or less radically) different from Clifford’s position. Lindner shows that examining the 
question whether Clifford or these critics are right eventually amounts to an empirical 
investigation; however, she also argues that this philosophical dead end can be avoided by 
drawing on results from the philosophical debate on doxastic voluntarism. Even though the 
question can thus not ultimately be answered, Lindner claims that Clifford’s ethics of belief 
fares better than his critics’ positions with regard to the results from this debate. Furthermore, 
the widely accepted moderate critical position does not fare much better than the radical one. 
Chapter 3 by Matthew Chrisman then proposes a specific account of how doxastic 
control can explain our responsibility for belief, and how this motivates a social approach 
toward epistemological issues. In the attempt to understand the norms governing believers, 
epistemologists have tended to focus on individual belief as the primary object of epistemic 
evaluation. However, norm governance is often assumed to concern, at base, things we can do 
as a free exercise or manifestation of our agency. Yet believing is not plausibly conceived as 
something we freely do but rather as a state we are in, usually as the mostly automatic or 
involuntary result of cognitively processes shaped by nature, bias, and ideology. In this 
chapter, Chrisman sketches a response to this tension. This response is based on rejecting the 
traditional theoretical focus on an individual’s particular beliefs as the primary object of 
normative epistemic evaluation. If we shift our focus from the particular beliefs of individuals 
to the community and its information managing practices, we may lessen the tension between 
norm governance and automaticity and involuntariness in a way that construes autonomous 
cognitive agency as a resultant of rather than a precondition for our norm-governed epistemic 
sociality. 
In chapter 4, Benoit Gaultier then concludes our first subpart by approaching the 
issues of control and normativity. He is asking how it is possible for deontic evaluations of 
beliefs to be appropriate if we do not have voluntary control over our beliefs. Gaultier argues 
that we should reject the claim that we can have indirect control over beliefs in virtue of the 
basic voluntary control we have over our actions. We have another kind of indirect control 
over beliefs: we can demonstrate doxastic strength or, on the contrary, doxastic weakness 
when forming our beliefs. That is, we can resist or, on the contrary, fail to resist the influence 
of some of our conative attitudes. And in the same way that we take our actions to be open to 
blame when they result from having demonstrated weakness of will even though this does not 
consist in doing something at will, we take our beliefs to be open to blame, and hence subject 
to deontic evaluation, when they result from having demonstrated doxastic weakness even 
though this does not consist in doing something at will. 
Chapter 5 by Lindsay Crawford opens our part on reasons for belief. The central 
dispute between evidentialists and pragmatists about reasons for belief concerns whether or 
not non-evidential considerations can be reasons for belief. In recent work, some pragmatists 
about reasons for belief have made their case for pragmatism by appealing, in part, to a broad 
range of cases in which facts about one’s relationships with significant others (friends, 
romantic partners, and the like) appear to give one non-evidential reasons to have beliefs 
skewed in their favor. Crawford explores whether and how such relationships might provide 
non-evidential reasons for belief. After first making the case against the evidentialist’s claim 
that there cannot be non-evidential reasons for belief, she turns to examine different accounts 
of how our personal relationships might ground reasons for doxastic partiality. These are 
accounts on which reasons for doxastic partiality are grounded in facts about what attitudes 
are partly constitutive of being a good significant other to someone, and accounts on which 
reasons for doxastic partiality are grounded in reasons, more broadly, to benefit one’s 
significant others. Crawford argues that our personal relationships do not provide non-
evidential reasons for belief, even if the pragmatist is right that there can be non-evidential 
reasons for belief. 
In the following chapter 6, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Mattias Skipper defend 
epistemic instrumentalism against a challenge from alleged asymmetries between epistemic 
and practical reasons. Epistemic instrumentalists think that epistemic normativity is just a 
special kind of instrumental normativity. According to them, you have epistemic reason to 
believe a proposition insofar as doing so is conducive to certain epistemic goals or aims – say, 
to believe what is true and avoid believing what is false. Perhaps the most prominent 
challenge for instrumentalists in recent years has been to explain, or explain away, why one’s 
epistemic reasons often do not seem to depend on one’s aims. This challenge can arguably be 
met. But a different challenge looms: instrumental reasons in the practical domain have 
various properties that epistemic reasons do not seem to share. In their contribution, Skipper 
and Steglich-Petersen offer a way for epistemic instrumentalists to overcome this challenge. 
Their main thesis takes the form of a conditional: if we accept an independently plausible 
transmission principle of instrumental normativity, we can maintain that epistemic reasons in 
fact do share the relevant properties of practical instrumental reasons. In addition, we can 
explain why epistemic reasons seem to lack these properties in the first place: some properties 
of epistemic reasons are elusive, or easy to overlook, because we tend to think and talk about 
epistemic reasons in an “elliptical” manner. 
Our final contribution on doxastic normativity in chapter 7 explores the boundaries of 
epistemic normativity. There Errol Lord argues that we can understand these better by 
thinking about which mental states are competitors in rationality’s competition. He argues 
that belief, disbelief, and two kinds of suspension of judgment are competitors. Lord shows 
that there are non-evidential reasons for suspension of judgment. One upshot is an 
independent motivation for a certain sort of pragmatist view of epistemic rationality. 
Our second main part on the ethics of mind more broadly opens with my own proposal 
for explaining responsibility for attitudes in chapter 8. There I argue that the problem of 
responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for 
responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being 
(ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of 
reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of 
epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons for attitudes. 
We are left with three options: denying that there are any reasons for attitudes, opting for 
pragmatism about reasons for attitudes, or arguing that the challenge rests on a 
misunderstanding of the normative force of reasons for attitudes. I finally suggest a version of 
the last strategy. We can understand the normative force of reasons for attitudes, and thereby 
solve the problem of mental responsibility, by acknowledging that the way we blame each 
other for irrationality is different from the way we blame each other when we failed to 
respond correctly to reasons for action. 
Gerhard Ernst’s chapter 9 then tries to clarify the nature of rationality. He does this by 
distinguishing two fundamentally different kinds of rationality: rationality in the “adjustment-
sense” and rationality in the “evaluation-sense.” A person is rational in the adjustment-sense 
if her mental states are well adjusted to each other, i.e. if her beliefs, emotions and intentions 
fit together (in a sense Ernst explains); a person is rational in the evaluation-sense if she has 
evaluative beliefs which are adequate on the basis of her non-evaluative beliefs. Our “rational 
response system,” as Ernst calls it, is concerned with keeping our mind unified by adjusting 
our mental states to each other and with evaluating what we believe. On the basis of the 
distinction between rationality in the adjustment-sense and rationality in the evaluation-sense 
one can understand what is right about the view that rationality consists in responding 
adequately to reasons and what is right about the view that rationality consists in being 
consistent (broadly understood).  
Our final subpart on the normativity of specific attitudes is opened by Justin Coates’ 
contribution on the ethics of blame in chapter 10. It is widely held that if an agent is not 
morally responsible for her action – i.e., if she is not deserving of blame – then we have a 
(decisive) reason to refrain from blaming her. But though this is true, the fact that someone is 
deserving of blame isn’t clearly sufficient for there to be most all-things-considered reason for 
blaming that person. Other considerations bear on this question as well. Coates offers an 
account of some of these considerations – particularly those that can serve as deontic 
constraints on blame. He also offers a reply to those skeptical of the “ethics of blame” on the 
grounds that such theorizing invariably appeals to the “wrong kind of reasons.” 
We then turn to the ethics of emotions in chapter 11 – more specifically, to Sabine 
Döring’s account of the ethics of fear in public contexts. The question is why it is that 
objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. Answering this 
question requires an analysis of the nature of fear in the public sphere since feeling safe 
means to feel that one avoids the frightening, i.e. the threats or dangers that one perceives in 
the world. Döring argues that the fact resistance fear might display in the public sphere is due 
to the characteristic function that fear fulfills in this sphere. In the public sphere, fear is 
typically embodied by “fear narratives,” i.e. by real life structuring stories of local groups 
which thereby respond to feelings of powerless fear and insecurity. By specifying what the 
threat is and how to deal with it in the right way, fear narratives reduce felt insecurity. 
Because of this and by thus enabling a feeling of superiority which may even turn the fear 
narrative into a narrative of enthusiastic heroism, fear in the public sphere does itself satisfy 
subjective preferences. This is why objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may 
come apart. The question is how we could and should handle this. 
In chapter 12, Matthew Soteriou considers the kind of agency, and thus responsibility, 
that is involved in deciding to act, rather than in acting itself. One of his aims is to trace out 
connections between the notion that we occupy a tensed temporal perspective from which we 
regard the future as open, and the notion that we occupy a deliberative standpoint from which 
we act under the idea of freedom. A further aim is to suggest that identifying connections 
between the psychology of self-determination and our temporal psychology should be central 
to an account of the sort of mental agency we exercise in deciding to act, and hence central to 
an account of what makes us responsible for our decisions. After having considered ways in 
which aspects of the psychology of our temporal perspective may contribute to explaining our 
capacity to exercise agency in deciding to act, Soteriou considers how our capacity to make 
decisions can contribute to explaining some of the distinctive features of the temporal 
perspective on the future that we occupy. In particular, he considers and responds to the 
suggestion that when it comes to our perspective on our future, there is a potential tension 
between the standpoint of theoretical reason and the standpoint of practical reason. 
Neal Tognazzini then turns to how we evaluate and judge one another for our passing 
thoughts in chapter 13. He explores the concept of judgmentalism: what it is and why it’s 
morally problematic. After criticizing an account offered by Gary Watson, Tognazzini argues 
for a broader understanding of what it is to be judgmental, encompassing not just the overall 
beliefs that we form about someone else, but also the very pattern of our thoughts about those 
with whom we are involved in interpersonal relationships. The thesis is that to care about 
someone is to be oriented toward them, or to see them through a particular mental lens, in a 
way that produces a particular pattern of salience and silence. That is: caring about someone 
(at least ideally) has the effect of making some features of that person particularly salient, and 
silencing or screening off other features from one’s consciousness. One is aptly described as 
judgmental when one’s thoughts do not display this sort of pattern, indicating a failure to fully 
adopt the orientation that constitutes properly caring about the person. 
Our final chapter 14 by Miriam Schleifer McCormick delineates the limits, or at least 
one limit, of the ethics of mind. Many theorists, including McCormick herself, have argued 
that some states of mind are appropriate targets of certain reactive attitudes even if they 
cannot be directly controlled. McCormick now worries that the scope of agency can be 
widened too far so that no area of mind is beyond the reach of appropriate assessment and 
judgement. She begins with the intuition that there is, or ought to be, a domain of the mind 
that is completely free of normative assessment, where you are safe to let your thoughts and 
images go wherever they take you without concern that you are doing anything wrong, where 
praise and shame do not apply. McCormick begins by offering an example of the kind of state 
she thinks should be beyond normative judgment; she argues that certain kinds of wakeful 
fantasies are on par with sleeping dreams. If one shares McCormick’s view that there is a 
“free” domain of the wakeful mind, then what she is doing can be seen as clarifying why such 
states exempt them from judgment. If one does not share this intuition, then what McCormick 
is doing can be seen as specifying what criteria would be needed for a kind of state (or 
domain) to be free in this sense. And then some may argue that no wakeful fantasies satisfy 
these criteria. McCormick addresses those arguments and argues that if the fantasies as 
characterized are appropriate targets of normative assessment, then it will be very difficult to 
exempt dreams of sleep, as well as other exercises of imagination. Of course, some people 
(like Augustine and surprisingly many others) will not mind this result. McCormick doesn’t 
think then that is the end of the discussion, stalemate and parting of intuitions. For she argues 
that a case can be made for the value of having a realm of imagination that is beyond the 
reach of any kind of judgment. 
 
4. Outlook 
These last papers which were concerned with the normativity of specific attitudes (chapters 
10–14) can be read as exploring various facets of an ethics of mind. They might thus provide 
building blocks for a more encompassing theory of mental normativity that has yet to be 
spelled out. Our contributions on the possibility of an ethics of mind (chapters 3, 4, and 8) as 
well as our chapters on what attitudes we ought to have, that is, on issues surrounding reasons 
and rationality (chapters 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9), are meant to inspire such an ethics of mind on a 
more abstract level – i.e., without focusing on any specific attitude. We hope that our volume 
motivates such approaches and brings epistemologists, (meta)ethicists, and philosophers of 
mind to a fruitful exchange.40 
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